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Abstract. Through the 1970s and 1980s—the days when ELTE philoso-
phy was named Marxism–Leninism—Imre Ruzsa prepared logic books and 
articles with sharp, comprehensive, up-to-date surveys of the most recent 
international developments in logic and the philosophy of language. For 
decades to come, the chapters of his Classical, Modal and Intensional Logic 
would be just about the only Hungarian-language sources available on W. 
V. O. Quine’s famous argument against modal logic, on Saul Kripke’s modal 
semantics that seemed to bypass the Quinean objections, and on Kripke’s 
arguments about the semantics of natural language: that proper names are 
rigid designators. Based primarily on John Burgess’s subsequent work, we 
can complete the picture of modal logic that Ruzsa painted in his survey 
by shedding light on additional important connections: crucial links not 
so much between Quine’s argument and Kripke’s formal work (as Ruzsa 
and others had thought), but instead between the Quinean argument and 
Kripke’s thesis about proper names being rigid designators.
Various stripes of modality—senses of ‘must’ and ‘can’, necessity and possi-
bility—are traditionally distinguished by logicians, linguists, and philosophers. 
Let us list a couple of them:
– Deontic modality—what is necessary/possible given laws or norms; that is, 
what the laws/norms require/permit. For example, “It is necessary (given 
public transportation regulations) that I buy a ticket to ride the tram”; more 
colloquially put: “I must buy a ticket to ride the tram”.
– Epistemic modality—what is necessary/possible given what is known. For 
example, “It is necessary (given what I know) that the Opera building is 
in the next block”; more colloquially put: “The Opera building must be in 
the next block”.
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There is also the category of alethic modality, concerning truth—what is nec-
essarily and possibly true. Within this, we can draw further distinctions; let us 
focus on necessity, leaving possibility aside (as is traditionally done):
– Necessary truth as logical truth (sometimes called ‘strict modality’)—truth 
given some system of logic, in other words, truth given the meanings of the 
logical vocabulary of a selected system. “I either buy a ticket or I don’t buy 
a ticket” is an example of a logical truth, for it is true in virtue of what ‘or’ 
and ‘not’ mean.
– Necessary truth as analytic truth—truth given the meanings of the words 
contained in the sentence. “All single people are unmarried” is an example 
of an analytic truth.
– Necessary truth as physical or natural necessity—truth given the laws of 
physics/laws of nature. “Trams travel slower than the speed of light” is an 
example of a truth of physics.
– Indeed, in his state-of-the-art 1984 survey volume Classical, Modal and In-
tensional Logic (written in Hungarian), Imre Ruzsa distinguished each of 
these stripes of modality (Ruzsa 1984, 119–121., 156–160.). What is conspi-
cuously missing from Ruzsa’s (and his contemporaries’) list is yet another 
sense of necessity within the alethic category: the notion of counterfactual 
or metaphysical necessity, brought into the limelight by Saul Kripke’s 1970 
lecture series “Naming and Necessity” (subsequently published as Kripke 
1980):
– Necessary truth as counterfactual (or metaphysical) necessity—truth across 
all counterfactual circumstances. “Aristotle is (was) human” is a plausible 
example of a metaphysically necessary truth. Although it is epistemically 
as well as logically and analytically possible for Aristotle to be a cat, it is not 
counterfactually or metaphysically possible that he is a cat.
Ruzsa’s Classical, Modal and Intensional Logic stood alone in various ways, pro-
viding just about the only Hungarian-language coverage of numerous landmarks 
in philosophy of language and logic for almost two decades:
(I) W. V. O. Quine’s arguments against modal logic (1943–1962)
(II) Kripke’s formal results: semantics for modal logic (1959–1963)
(III) Kripke on the semantics of natural language, specifically, his theory that 
proper names are so-called rigid designators. (1970)
As for (I), it was not until 2002 that a collection of Quine’s essays was published 
in Hungarian, including his definitive formulation of his attack on modal logic 
“Reference and Modality” (Quine 1953, discussed in detail below). Until then, 
there were just three articles by Quine available in Hungarian: “Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism” (Quine 1951/1973) as well as two smaller chapters from Quine’s 
attacks on modal logic (Quine 1963, 1947 both in Copi–Gould 1964/1985). Ruz-
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sa’s 30-page section entitled “Modality and Quantification: Logic ‘Conceived in 
Sin’” was thus, for quite some time, the Hungarian source to consult on Quine’s 
attacks on modal logic (Ruzsa 1984, 164–193).
As for (II), to this day, none of Kripke’s formal work has been translated into 
Hungarian, and Ruzsa’s 20-page section entitled “Kripke’s Modal Semantics” 
remains the definitive secondary source to turn to in Hungarian (Ruzsa 1984. 
227–248, see also Ruzsa 1988, XX). In addition, Ruzsa went on to develop his 
own Quine-proof system of modal logic (Ruzsa 1984, 290–345).
As for (III), not until the late 1990s was there any Hungarian coverage or trans-
lation of Kripke’s Naming and Necessity available in Hungarian, apart from Ruz-
sa’s 13-page section on Kripke’s rigidity thesis (Ruzsa 1984. 302–315). Kripke 
argues that proper names like ‘Aristotle’ exhibit distinctive behavior within a 
certain rather straightforward kind of modal context: they are rigid designators, 
that is, they refer to the same individual with respect to every counterfactual 
situation. The rigidity thesis yields a powerful argument against Frege’s de-
scriptivist theory of proper names, which associates proper names with definite 
descriptions—such as ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’—that are non-rigid: 
after all, in a counterfactual situation in which someone else taught Alexander 
the Great, this definite description picks out someone other than Aristotle. The 
turn of the 20th-21st centuries brought the Hungarian translation of Kripke’s 
“Identity and Necessity” paper, which also discusses the rigidity thesis (Kripke 
1971/2004; see also the brief excerpts collection Kripke 1980/1997). Around the 
same time, important, albeit brief coverage of the rigidity thesis appeared in 
(Sainsbury 1997, 85–89) and (Farkas–Kelemen 2002, 135–145). The Hungar-
ian translation of Naming and Necessity, along with an 87-page companion article 
was published fairly recently (Kripke 1980/2007, Zvolenszky 2007). Again, for 
almost two decades, Ruzsa’s 1984 book provided one of very few sources on 
Kripke’s work on the semantics of natural language.
My goal in this short paper is to highlight, beyond (I)–(III), two more aspects 
of the debate between Quine and Kripke, neither of which have been properly 
recognized by Ruzsa or his contemporaries:
Supplementing (I): (a) Quine’s lasting argument against modal logic, and his 
challenge to locate an alternative notion of necessity unaffected by his ar-
guments (especially in Quine 1953, 1960, 1963).
Supplementing (III): (b) The role of Kripke’s explication of the notion of 
metaphysical necessity (1970).
These complete the picture painted by Ruzsa’s pioneering survey in Classi-
cal, Modal and Intensional Logic.
* * *
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From the 1940s through the 1960s, Quine put forth various arguments against 
modal logic and did not properly distinguish them, which made interpreting 
him no easy task. One of these arguments—(a)—stands, posing a challenge that 
was not met until Kripke’s observations about counterfactual necessity—(b)—
appeared on the scene. Yet this went unrecognized until much later—from the 
late 1990s, particularly by John Burgess (1997) and Stephen Neale (2000):
(a) Preliminary formulation: Quine’s lasting argument: Certain formulas of 
modal logic lack sense, they cannot be interpreted.
Let us see how we might arrive at such a suspect, uninterpretable formula. 
Imagine a traveler who knows all too well that the Isonzo river is identical with 
the Isonzo. She might still be surprised upon arriving at the river Soča (adver-
tised in brochures as the whitewater rafting paradise of Slovenia), when she 
learns that it is one and the same river as the Isonzo, the scene of numerous bat-
tles in World War I that she had read about in history books. (Indeed, I myself 
was in for that surprise when travelling to Slovenia: that the Soča is one and the 
same as the Isonzo constituted a discovery). Thus if we interpret  as, say, epis-
temic necessity, then (1) is indeed true given what our traveler knows, while (2) 
is false. Similarly, if we interpret  as analytic necessity—as Quine does—(1) is 
true given the meanings of the words featured (all of which are familiar to our 
traveler), while (2) is false (given her subsequent discovery):
(1) It is necessarily true that the Isonzo is identical with the Isonzo.
 Isonzo = Isonzo  true
(2)  It is necessarily true that the Soča river is identical with the Isonzo.
 Soča = Isonzo   false
The truth value assignments for (1) and (2) remain unaltered even if we in-
terpret  as logical necessity, truth in virtue of the meanings of the logical vo-
cabulary. Indeed, it will help our exegesis to introduce the category of linguistic 
necessity to cover both analytic and logical necessity: for both concern truth in 
virtue of the meanings of certain expressions; the difference is only whether we 
consider the meanings of all vocabulary items or just the logical ones. Crucially, 
in formulating his argument (a), Quine’s concern was with linguistic necessity 
(what he called strict necessity), although he rarely made this explicit, especially 
in his later work.
We can generalize over (1) to arrive at one of the suspect formulas:
(3)  There is a thing x, such that x is identical with the Isonzo.
x  (x = Isonzo)
Interpretive trouble ensues: What is this river which, according to (3), is nec-
essarily identical with the Isonzo? According to (1), from which (3) was inferred, 
it is the Isonzo, that is, the Soča; but to suppose this would conflict with the fact 
that (2) is false. In a word, to be necessarily [in the linguistic sense] identical 
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with the Isonzo is not a trait of the river, but depends on the manner of referring 
to the river. (adapted from Quine 1953, 148)
(3) is an instance of quantifying in, that is, binding the variable x within the 
scope of the modal operator  by the quantifier x, which is outside the scope 
of . This is the sort of construction that spells interpretive trouble when it 
comes to linguistic necessity, according to Quine. He did not think he has given 
a general argument against quantifying into any modal context whatsoever (as 
many interpreters at the time thought)—he says this much in the following pas-
sage (see also Quine 1963):
What has been said of modality in these pages relates only to strict [that 
is, linguistic] modality. For other sorts, for example, physical necessity and 
possibility, the first problem would be to formulate the notions clearly and exactly. 
Afterwards we could investigate whether such modalities, like the strict 
ones, cannot be quantified into without precipitating an ontological cri-
sis. The question concerns intimately the practical uses of language. … In 
discussions of physics, naturally, we need quantifications containing the 
clause ‘x is soluble in water’, or the equivalent in words; but … we should 
then have to admit within quantifications the expression … ‘necessarily if x 
is in water then x dissolves’. Yet we do not know whether there is a suitable 
sense of ‘necessarily’ into which we can so quantify. (Quine 1953, 158-159.; 
emphasis added)
Here, Quine poses a challenge: quantifying in spells interpretive trouble for 
linguistic notions of necessity; when considering how interpretation would go 
with alternative notions of necessity (physical necessity, for example), first, 
those notions should be clarified, then the question of interpreting quantifying 
in can be raised. Accordingly, we can expand (a):
(a) Quine’s lasting argument: When considering the (then-)established no-
tion of necessity, that of linguistic necessity, certain modal logic formulas (those 
involving quantifying in) lack sense, they cannot be interpreted.
Quine’s associated challenge: Clarify an alternative notion of necessity, and if 
the need for interpreting quantifying in arises with respect to that notion, then 
check that there is no interpretive trouble there.
In what follows we will unpack Quine’s lasting argument (following primarily 
Burgess 1997), and see how Kripke responds to Quine’s associated challenge by 
bringing in the notion of metaphysical necessity. But before that, let us intro-
duce a preliminary distinction between de dicto and de re statements:
a de dicto (“about the sentence”) statement:
(4) Necessarily, all single people are unmarried.
“The following is necessary: all singles are unmarried.” 
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a de re (“about the thing”) statement:
(5) All single people are necessarily unmarried.
“All singles bear the modal attribute of being necessarily unmarried.” 
Consider, for a moment, the counterfactual sense of necessity. According to 
it, (4) is true, for in all counterfactual circumstances, everyone who is single is 
unmarried. Meanwhile, (5) is false: for those who are in fact single might, in 
an alternative scenario, have gotten married instead—they are not single in all 
counterfactual situations.
Now we can spell out step by step Quine’s request for interpreting quantify-
ing in, this time with linguistic necessity at hand:
Step 1. First we need to make sense of the open formula ‘ (x = Isonzo)’.
Step 2. This requires making sense of de re modal claims.
Step 3. The de dicto claims at hand are (1) and (2), and their de re counterparts 
are (1r) and (2r):
(1)  Isonzo = Isonzo     true
(1r) It is true of the Isonzo that it is necessarily identical with the Isonzo.
x (x = Isonzo &  x = Isonzo)    ?
(2)  Soča = Isonzo      false
(2r) x (x = Soča &  x = Isonzo)    ?
But the notion of linguistic necessity—about truth given the meanings of ex-
pressions—provides guidance for interpreting de dicto modal claims only; there is 
no direct guidance for making sense of de re modal claims. (For what might that 
river be that is analytically or logically identical with the Isonzo, given that (1) and 
(2) differ in truth value?)
Step 4. We have two strategies for interpreting (1r) and (2r), but both turn out 
unacceptable.
Step 5. The first strategy for interpreting de re modal claims is:
the unselective strategy: the de dicto statement yields its de re counterpart—for 
any proper name whatsoever.
This yields an unacceptable outcome: we have objects with contradictory 
properties: the river Isonzo a.k.a. Soča is at once analytically identical with the 
Isonzo (qua Isonzo) and not analytically identical with it (qua Soča). The cost 
of avoiding this is high: we have to give up on the idea that the truth of de dicto 
modal claims may in part depend on the words and names used. But linguistic 
necessity is supposed to be about truth in virtue of the meaning of certain ex-
pressions, so this option is unacceptable.
Step 6. The second strategy for interpreting de re modal claims is:
the selective strategy: de dicto modal claims yield their de re counterparts in se-
lected cases only—with respect to standard names.
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For example, if ‘Isonzo’ counts as a standard name while ‘Soča’ does not, then 
we cannot get (2r) from (2). But then we would have to make arbitrary deci-
sions about which natural-language proper name to regard as standard: ‘Cicero’ 
or ‘Tully’? ‘Burma’ or ‘Myanmar’?
Step 7. With linguistic necessity, the standard names featured in the selective 
strategy lead to an arbitrary form of essentialism:
“Evidently, the reversion to Aristotelian essentialism … is required if quan-
tification into modal contexts is to be insisted on. An object, of itself and by 
whatever name or none, must be seen as having some of its traits necessar-
ily and others contingently, despite the fact that the latter traits follow just 
as analytically from some ways of specifying the object as the former traits 
do from other ways of specifying it.” (Quine 1953, 155)
In other words, with standard names chosen arbitrarily, we end up with ar-
bitrary choices for what is and what is not analytically true of an object. So the 
distinction between essential and accidental properties of objects—this is what 
essentialism is committed to—will be arbitrarily drawn.
For linguistic necessity, this seven-step argument does conclusively show that 
interpreting de re modal claims spells trouble whichever interpretive strategy we 
follow, making the first half of (a) a lasting argument indeed. The second half 
of (a), Quine’s challenge is: we have (yet) to locate a notion of necessity which 
allows us to make sense of de re modal statements without running into unac-
ceptable consequences. It is to this challenge that (Kripke 1980/2007) provides 
a response:
(b) Kripke’s response to Quine’s challenge: with the notion of counterfactual 
(metaphysical) necessity spelled out, interpreting de re modal claims is no longer 
problematic.
The following seem like plausible candidates for true de re modal claims: Cic-
ero was necessarily human, but was only contingently born outside Rome; there 
is a counterfactual situation in which he was born in Rome, but there is no coun-
terfactual situation in which he fails to be human. With this counterfactual notion 
of necessity at hand, our interpretation of de re modal claims is directly given; 
there is no need for either the selective or the unselective strategy of piggyback-
ing on de dicto modal claims.
Ruzsa, along with contemporary commentators of Quine, thought that 
Quine’s argument against modal logic (a, that is) targeted all stripes of modality. 
Hence, they thought that providing a framework for accommodating formulas 
with quantifying in—Kripke’s formal work from the 1950s and 1960s (for exam-
ple, Kripke 1963)—suffices to show that quantified modal logic is viable after 
all. (Indeed, commentators were in a difficult position because alongside his 
lasting argument, Quine also gave other, more general arguments against inter-
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preting quantified modal logic, without properly distinguishing them from one 
another; for problems raised for some of the general arguments, see for example 
Kaplan 1986 and Fine 1989, 1990.) Ruzsa and others also considered Quine’s 
charge that quantified modal logic comes with a high price tag—embroilment 
in essentialism, that is, commitment to a distinction between essential and acci-
dental properties of objects (in Step 7)—to arise for quantified modal logics of all 
stripes. Yet again, there is a crucial detail to realize about Quine’s argumentative 
strategy: his claim that essentialism is untenable is doubly embedded within his 
argument: first, it is featured within one of the interpretive strategies for mak-
ing sense of de re modal claims (the one based on standard names); and second, 
we get an arbitrary, and hence objectionable form of essentialism specifically in 
the case of linguistic necessity, precisely because of the need to rely on stand-
ard names. In short, the lasting argument of Quine’s does not claim that across 
the board, there is a problem with interpreting de re modal formulas; nor does it 
claim that across the board, essentialism is objectionable. And the response for 
his challenge calling for an alternative notion of modality where the interpretive 
problem is resolved, is in fact met not in Kripke’s formal work, but in Kripke’s 
observations about the semantics of natural language, when, in propounding his 
rigidity thesis, he also clarified the notion of counterfactual necessity (b, that 
is). (a) and (b) are then the missing links that complete the otherwise admirably 
detailed and illuminating picture of state-of-the-art modal logic and modal se-
mantics that Imre Ruzsa relayed to Hungarian readers back in 1984.
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